By Seun Perez Adekunle
Yet reactions to the initiative reveal the depth of disagreement that still surrounds the issue. Regional socio-political organisations have taken sharply divergent positions that mirror Nigeria’s broader political and regional fault lines. The Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), representing a prominent northern perspective, has cautioned against moving too quickly. Its leaders insist that state police cannot be created without constitutional amendment and warn that establishing implementation structures prematurely amounts to putting the cart before the horse. Beyond the procedural argument, some northern voices fear that state police could be misused by governors to intimidate political opponents and consolidate power.
This concern is not entirely hypothetical. Nigeria’s earlier experiment with regional policing during the First Republic left a historical memory of political abuse. Critics argue that the same political dynamics that produced electoral manipulation in the 1960s could reappear if governors gain direct control over police institutions. Some skeptics also question whether state police would truly address the underlying causes of insecurity, arguing that the proposal is sometimes presented as a “magic wand” that may not deliver the expected results.
In contrast, several southern organisations have embraced the proposal enthusiastically. The pan-Yoruba group Afenifere has long advocated decentralised policing, arguing that crime is fundamentally local and therefore requires local knowledge to combat effectively.
Similarly, the Pan Niger Delta Forum (PANDEF) has argued that the scale of insecurity confronting Nigeria has become too overwhelming for the federal government alone to manage. For these groups, the emergence of regional security outfits across the country demonstrates that decentralisation is already happening in practice, even if the constitutional framework has yet to catch up.
Indeed, the proliferation of sub-national security initiatives has become one of the most striking features of Nigeria’s contemporary security landscape. In the South-West, the Amotekun Corps has evolved into a major regional security outfit tasked with protecting rural communities and supporting conventional law enforcement. In the South-East, Ebube Agu emerged as a regional response to growing insecurity.
The Civilian Joint Task Force in the North-East played a crucial role in resisting Boko Haram insurgents at the height of the conflict, while Hisbah institutions in parts of the North have taken on community policing functions within their jurisdictions. These organisations vary widely in mandate and effectiveness, but together they represent attempts by communities and state governments to compensate for perceived gaps in federal policing capacity.
Some states have even begun positioning themselves for a future transition to formal state policing. Lagos State, for instance, argues that its Neighbourhood Safety Agency already provides the structural foundation for such a system. According to the agency’s leadership, its operations are built around grassroots intelligence gathering, early threat detection and proactive community engagement, which are principles that align closely with the philosophy of state policing.
If constitutional amendments eventually permit decentralised policing, institutions like these could form the nucleus of new state police structures.
Supporters of state policing believe the potential advantages are significant. Local recruitment would mean that officers are familiar with the languages, culture and geography of the communities they serve. Such familiarity could enhance intelligence gathering and make it easier to detect criminal networks operating within local environments. Decentralisation could also reduce bureaucratic delays associated with decision-making from distant federal command structures, enabling faster responses to security threats.
Another frequently cited benefit is the possibility of stronger community trust. Citizens often view centrally deployed police officers as outsiders who lack understanding of local conditions. State police forces rooted within communities could foster closer relationships between law enforcement and the public, potentially encouraging greater cooperation in crime prevention. At the national level, decentralisation could also allow the federal police to concentrate on complex crimes such as terrorism, organised crime, cybercrime and transnational criminal networks.
Yet the fears raised by critics cannot be dismissed lightly. One of the most persistent concerns is political manipulation. Former Federal Capital Territory Commissioner of Police Lawrence Alobi recently warned that the proposed creation of state police could undermine professionalism if politicians are allowed to exercise direct control over the institution.
According to him, political interference has already affected operational discipline within the existing policing system, particularly when politicians attempt to influence postings and operational decisions. If such interference were to occur at the state level, the consequences could be more severe. Governors might be tempted to use police institutions to intimidate political rivals, suppress dissent or shape electoral outcomes. In a political environment where competition for power can already be intense, critics argue that granting governors direct control over armed police forces could deepen political tensions.
Financial sustainability also presents a significant challenge. Establishing professional police institutions requires substantial and sustained investment in training, equipment, and technology and personnel welfare. Many Nigerian states already struggle to meet existing fiscal obligations. Without adequate funding, state police forces could become poorly resourced and ineffective, potentially creating new security problems rather than solving existing ones.
There is also the question of coordination within federal security architecture. A country with thirty-six state police forces alongside a federal police institution would require clear constitutional and operational guidelines to prevent jurisdictional conflicts. The constitution would need to clearly define which categories of crimes fall under federal authority and which fall within the jurisdiction of state police forces.
However, the existence of risks does not necessarily invalidate the concept. Many federal countries operate multi-layered policing systems without institutional breakdown. The key difference lies in the strength of legal safeguards and accountability mechanisms governing those institutions. If Nigeria eventually adopts state policing, success will depend less on the idea itself and more on the institutional design that accompanies it.
Ultimately, the debate over state policing is a reflection of a deeper constitutional question about the nature of Nigeria’s federal system. Nigeria describes itself as a federation, yet one of the most fundamental functions of governance remains concentrated at the centre. The tension between these two realities has increasingly come into focus as security challenges multiply.
The country therefore faces a delicate balancing act. Decentralising policing could bring law enforcement closer to the communities it is meant to serve. At the same time, it introduces legitimate concerns about political abuse, financial sustainability and institutional coordination. The challenge for policymakers is not merely deciding whether state police should exist, but designing a system capable of preserving both local responsiveness and national cohesion.
Nigeria’s security crisis has made the search for new approaches unavoidable. Whether state policing ultimately becomes part of the country’s institutional framework will depend on how successfully policymakers can reconcile the competing imperatives of security effectiveness, democratic accountability and federal balance.
Concluded.
Adekunle is a Political Science and International Relations lecturer. He wrote from Ibadan.
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