By Uche J. Udenka
The debate on state police in Nigeria has long been framed as a political gamble—an optional reform fraught with risks of abuse and fragmentation. Nowhere is the inadequacy of this framing more evident than in the South-East. What confronts the region today is not a speculative governance dilemma but a constitutional and security crisis produced by the structural failure of Nigeria’s centralised policing system.
In the South-East, insecurity has become both chronic and misunderstood, driven less by criminal pathology than by institutional disconnect, intelligence failure, and a policing architecture that is alien to the communities it purports to protect.
Security, in constitutional terms, is not an aspirational objective; it is a foundational obligation of the state. Section 14(2)(b) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) declares unequivocally that “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government.” When a governance structure persistently fails to deliver this purpose, constitutional fidelity demands reform—not ritual defence of a broken model.
The South-East paradox: Over-policed, under-protected.
The South-East presents a paradox that exposes the contradictions of centralised policing. The region is among the most heavily militarised in peacetime Nigeria, yet remains acutely insecure. Checkpoints proliferate; armoured vehicles dominate highways; joint task forces operate continuously. And still, communities suffer from kidnapping, targeted assassinations, criminal opportunism, and retaliatory violence. This is not evidence of insufficient force; it is proof of misapplied force.
Centralised policing treats insecurity in the South-East as an ideological problem rather than a policing one. Criminality is collapsed into political agitation, and legitimate grievances are securitised instead of resolved. The result is a breakdown of trust between security agencies and local populations—an outcome fatal to intelligence-led policing.
No police force can function effectively where it is feared, not trusted; deployed, not embedded.
Constitutional fiction: Governors without control.
Nigeria’s Constitution designates state governors as Chief Security Officers, yet strips them of operational authority over the police. Section 215 places the Nigeria Police Force under federal control, with the Inspector-General answerable to the President. Governors may “give lawful directions,” but enforcement depends entirely on federal discretion. This is a constitutional contradiction—one that renders state executives accountable for security failures they cannot structurally prevent.
In the South-East, this fiction has had grave consequences. Governors are blamed for insecurity, communities turn to self-help, and federal forces—unfamiliar with local terrain, language, and social networks—attempt to police from a distance. The constitutional imbalance fosters irresponsibility at the centre and helplessness at the periphery.
State police would correct this anomaly by aligning authority with responsibility—one of the oldest principles of constitutional governance.
Why the South-East needs state police
The South-East’s security challenges are uniquely localised. They include:
Fragmented criminal groups exploiting political tensions; rural kidnappings linked to forest corridors and abandoned farmlands;
youth alienation driven by unemployment and perceived collective punishment; intelligence breakdown caused by language and cultural distance between officers and communities.
A centrally recruited, centrally deployed police force cannot effectively address these realities. State police, recruited locally, trained to national standards, and supervised within constitutional limits, can.
Abuse arguments and constitutional safeguards.
Opponents of state police frequently invoke the abuses of regional police in the First Republic. But constitutional democracies do not fossilise structures because of past misuse; they design safeguards to prevent recurrence. Federal police in contemporary Nigeria have themselves been repeatedly accused of political partisanship, electoral interference, and selective enforcement. Centralisation has not inoculated Nigeria against abuse.
The constitutional answer lies in regulation, not prohibition. A properly designed state police system would include:
Independent State Police Service Commissions insulated from executive capture; Federal minimum standards for recruitment, training, and arms control; Judicial oversight and enforceable fundamental rights protections; Legislative budgetary scrutiny by state assemblies and Clear federal intervention thresholds in cases of systemic abuse. These mechanisms strengthen, rather than weaken constitutional order.
Federalism properly understood.
Nigeria is constitutionally described as a federation, yet its policing model is unitary. This is an anomaly, not a virtue. True federalism accommodates diversity within unity. It decentralises functions that are best handled locally while preserving national standards and supremacy.
In the South-East, the insistence on a monolithic police structure has not preserved national cohesion; it has eroded it. Communities increasingly perceive federal security forces as external occupiers rather than constitutional protectors. This perception—whether accurate or not—is corrosive to legitimacy.
State police would not balkanise Nigeria. It would domesticate security, restoring policing to its proper role as a civic service rather than an instrument of distant authority.
Informal security: The dangerous alternative
The absence of state police has not prevented decentralisation; it has merely driven it underground. Vigilante groups, neighbourhood watch units, and informal armed actors have emerged to fill the vacuum. These groups operate without uniform standards, constitutional accountability, or human-rights safeguards. This is the real threat to national stability.
Formalising decentralised policing through constitutional amendment is safer than tolerating its unregulated emergence.
A constitutional moment.
President Bola Tinubu’s call for legislative review of state police provisions is not symbolic. It is an acknowledgment that Nigeria’s security architecture is no longer fit for purpose. For the South-East—where mistrust, mischaracterisation, and militarisation have deepened insecurity—this moment is especially consequential.
The National Assembly must rise above political fear and confront constitutional reality. Section 14(2)(b) cannot remain aspirational. It must be operationalised through structures that work.
Law, not force, will secure the South-East
The South-East does not need more checkpoints or heavier deployments. It needs lawful, local, accountable policing rooted in community trust and constitutional clarity. State police is not a concession to separatism; it is a recommitment to federalism. It is not a retreat from unity; it is a strategy for preserving it.
In constitutional terms, the refusal to reform a demonstrably failing security system is itself unconstitutional. Nigeria must choose whether to govern by fear of the past or by fidelity to present obligations. For the South-East—and for the federation as a whole—state police is no longer optional. It is necessary.
Udenka is a social and political analyst.
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