By Oliver Azi
The commencement of proceedings during the vacation of the Federal High Court presents a peculiar procedural question. While the court does not ordinarily sit during the periods designated as vacation, the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019 preserve access to the court for matters requiring urgent judicial intervention. This creates a procedure that is familiar to practitioners but is sometimes misunderstood: the filing of a Summons in Chambers (which, in practice, is to be done in open court) for urgent hearing, often referred to in practice as a “Summons Ex Parte.”
The expression, however, requires some clarification. The summons is not, strictly speaking, the originating process by which every substantive action is commenced at the Federal High Court. Rather, it is the procedural mechanism contemplated by the Rules for obtaining the court’s permission to have an action heard during a period when the court is ordinarily not sitting. This distinction is important. A party may properly commence an action by the mode prescribed for that particular action, yet still be unable to have the action heard during vacation unless the requirements of the vacation procedure are satisfied.
The issue is therefore not simply whether an action can be filed during vacation. It is whether, having regard to the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019, the nature of the action, the circumstances giving rise to it and the applicable vacation arrangements, the court can properly entertain the matter during vacation. This article examines the statutory and procedural basis for vacation sittings of the Federal High Court, the nature of the Summons in Chambers, the meaning of urgency, the relevant judicial authorities, and the consequences of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure.
The Federal High Court and Vacation Sittings
The starting point is Order 46 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019. The provision of Order 46 Rule 4 provides for the periods during which the ordinary sittings of the court for the dispatch of civil matters are suspended. These include public holidays, the Easter period, the period commencing on 23 December and ending on 5 January, and the long vacation. The long vacation commences from a day in July and ends on a Friday not less than six weeks later, as the Chief Judge may determine by notification.
The vacation is therefore not merely an administrative arrangement. It has a procedural consequence: ordinary civil sittings are suspended during the prescribed periods. The suspension of ordinary sittings does not, however, amount to the closure of the judicial institution. Order 46 Rule 5 creates an important exception. Notwithstanding the periods specified in Rule 4, an action may be heard during vacation where the action is urgent or where a Judge, at the request of the parties concerned, agrees to hear it. The Rules further provide that an application for urgent hearing is to be made by summons in chambers.
Hence, by the foregoing, Order 46 Rule 8 complements this provision by empowering the Chief Judge to assign one or more Judges as Vacation Judges to hear and determine urgent causes, matters or applications during the vacation period. The architecture of the Rules is therefore relatively clear. There is a general suspension of ordinary civil sittings during vacation, coupled with a limited mechanism for the hearing of matters that require judicial attention notwithstanding the recess. This mechanism is what gives practical significance to the Summons in Chambers.
The current practice of the Federal High Court confirms the continuing relevance of these provisions. For the 2026 annual vacation, the Chief Judge announced that the vacation would run from 27 July to 11 September 2026 pursuant to Order 46 Rule 4(d), while designated Vacation Courts in Abuja, Lagos, Port Harcourt and Enugu would remain available for urgent matters. The Court expressly advised practitioners to file and prosecute urgent matters only at the designated Vacation Courts.
The Summons Ex Parte: What Exactly Is It?
The expression “Summons Ex Parte” is commonly used in practice to describe the process through which an applicant seeks to have a matter heard during vacation. There is, however, a need for precision. The provision of Order 46 Rule 5(2) of the 2019 Rules provides that an application for urgent hearing shall be made by summons in chambers. This is materially different from saying that the summons itself is the originating process for the substantive action.
The provision of Order 3 of the Rules governs the form and commencement of civil proceedings. It identifies the principal methods by which civil proceedings may be commenced, including writ of summons and originating summons, depending on the nature of the claim. The Rules therefore distinguish between an originating process and a summons used for a procedural application. The distinction is particularly important because the purpose of the vacation summons is narrow. It is directed at obtaining the court’s intervention during a period when ordinary civil sittings are suspended.
Accordingly, where a practitioner is commencing an ordinary civil action during vacation, the appropriate originating process must still be determined by reference to the nature of the substantive claim. The fact that the action is urgent or is being filed during vacation does not, by itself, transform the substantive originating process into a summons. The Summons in Chambers is therefore better understood as the gateway to the hearing of an otherwise competent action during vacation, rather than as a universal alternative mode of commencing civil proceedings.
Urgency as the Foundation of Vacation Jurisdiction
The central concept in Order 46 Rule 5 is urgency. The Rules do not provide an exhaustive definition of what constitutes an urgent action. What is urgent depends substantially on the circumstances of each case.
The word ordinarily connotes a matter requiring immediate attention or action. In General Hydrocarbons Limited v First Bank of Nigeria Limited Suit No. FHC/L/CS/2378/2024, the Federal High Court considered Order 46 Rules 4, 5 and 8 and emphasised that the Rules empower the court to entertain an urgent matter during vacation. The court considered the ordinary meaning of “urgent” as requiring immediate or prompt attention. Urgency, therefore, cannot simply be asserted as a conclusion. An applicant seeking vacation hearing should place before the court facts demonstrating why waiting until the regular resumption of court sittings would occasion prejudice, defeat the purpose of the action, render the relief nugatory or otherwise occasion an injustice.
This is particularly important because vacation jurisdiction is exceptional. The vacation court is not intended to become a substitute for the regular court merely because a party desires an earlier hearing. A practitioner should therefore distinguish between a matter that is important and a matter that is urgent. The fact that a client’s interests are significant does not necessarily establish urgency. Nor does the mere existence of a legal right requiring enforcement automatically justify vacation hearing. The affidavit supporting the application should disclose the factual circumstances that make immediate judicial intervention necessary.
Oliver Azi is an Abuja based lawyer and law teacher. He can be reached at oliverazi20@gmail.com
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