By Jacob Shekwobashawye Samuel
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The internet has fundamentally transformed the manner in which Nigerians communicate, participate in public affairs, scrutinise government and expose alleged wrongdoing. Social-media platforms such as X, Instagram, Facebook, TikTok and other digital platforms have become modern public spaces where citizens question government policies, challenge public officials, report alleged misconduct and express opinions on matters of public concern.
A smartphone can now give an ordinary citizen the ability to communicate with thousands or even millions of people without owning a newspaper, television station or radio station. Digital technology has therefore significantly democratised public participation. That development, however, has a darker side.
The same technology can be used for cyberstalking, threats, harassment, fraud, impersonation, extortion, identity theft, fabrication of documents and the deliberate dissemination of harmful falsehoods. The State consequently has a legitimate interest in regulating genuinely criminal conduct committed through computer systems and networks.
The difficult legal question is therefore not whether cyberspace should be regulated. It is where the law should draw the boundary between legitimate online criticism and punishable cybercrime. That question has acquired renewed importance following the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) (Amendment) Act, 2024, which substantially altered section 24 of the 2015 Act, and following recent proceedings involving social-media publications concerning the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC).
The central argument of this article is that Nigeria does not have to choose between freedom of expression and protection from cybercrime. Both interests can coexist. Section 39 of the Constitution protects freedom of expression, while section 45 recognises that certain restrictions may be constitutionally permissible. The
Cybercrimes Act may therefore legitimately criminalise specified conduct, provided that the statutory elements are clearly established and the restriction remains constitutionally defensible.
The real challenge is distinguishing criticism from criminality. A citizen should ordinarily be free to say that a government policy has failed, that an agency has performed poorly, that an official should resign or that an institution should investigate an allegation of corruption. But a person who makes a genuine threat to kill another, uses communication to extort money, deliberately fabricates material for deceptive purposes or otherwise satisfies the ingredients of a criminal offence cannot automatically escape liability merely because the conduct occurred online. The law must therefore protect both democratic dissent and the public from genuine cyber-enabled criminality.
2.0 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION UNDER THE NIGERIAN CONSTITUTION
Section 39(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), provides that:
“Every person shall be entitled to freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference.”
The provision is a fundamental constitutional guarantee. It protects not merely the right to speak, but also the right to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information. The democratic significance of the provision cannot be overstated. Citizens must be able to discuss public affairs, question government decisions, scrutinise public officials and disagree with those exercising public power.
Freedom of expression would have little value if it protected only speech that was pleasant or favourable to those in authority. The constitutional protection necessarily extends to disagreement, criticism and unpopular opinions.
In Din v African Newspapers of Nigeria Ltd (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 139) 392, the Supreme Court recognised the importance of the right to comment freely on matters of public interest. The decision remains significant in understanding the relationship between public-interest commentary and freedom of expression. Likewise, Arthur Nwankwo v State (1985) 6 NCLR 228 is an important Nigerian authority concerning the constitutional importance of freedom of expression and political criticism.
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Solomon Okedara v Attorney-General of the Federation, CA/L/174/18 (Court of Appeal, Lagos Division, 2019) is particularly relevant to the history of section 24 of the
Cybercrimes Act. The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the original section 24(1), arguing, among other things, that it violated sections 36(12) and 39 of the Constitution. The Court of Appeal rejected the challenge and upheld the validity of the provision.
Okedara is important, but it must be read historically. It concerned the 2015 version of section 24(1). The legislature subsequently amended section 24 in 2024. The constitutional assessment of the present provision must therefore begin with the wording of the law currently in force, not simply with the wording considered in Okedara.
3.0 THE CONTROVERSIAL ORIGINAL SECTION 24
The original section 24(1) of the Cybercrimes Act 2015 criminalised certain messages transmitted through computer systems or networks where the statutory requirements were satisfied.
Among the expressions contained in the original provision were communications that were grossly offensive, pornographic, indecent, obscene or of a menacing character, as well as knowingly false communications intended to cause, among other things, annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred, ill will or needless anxiety. The breadth of some of those expressions generated considerable constitutional controversy such as:
What constitutes a “grossly offensive” message?
What degree of “annoyance” is sufficient?
When does “insult” become criminal?
Could a strongly worded political publication that causes inconvenience to a public official fall within the provision?
These were not merely theoretical questions. They formed part of the constitutional challenge considered in Solomon Okedara v Attorney-General of the
Federation. The appellant argued that expressions contained in section 24(1), including concepts such as “grossly offensive”, “annoyance”, “insult”, “ill will” and “needless anxiety”, were vague and potentially capable of capturing legitimate expression. The Court nevertheless held that the provision was not unconstitutional.
The legislative controversy, however, continued beyond the judgment. The subsequent amendment of section 24 in 2024 is therefore significant because it altered the statutory landscape against which Okedara must now be understood.
4.0 THE 2024 AMENDMENT: A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE
Section 24(1), as amended in 2024, criminalises specified communications transmitted through a computer system or network where the communication is pornographic or where the person knowingly sends a false message or matter for the purposes specified in paragraph (b), including causing a breakdown of law and order or posing a threat to life.
This represents a substantial departure from the language of the original provision. The amendment removed several expressions previously appearing in section 24(1), including “annoyance”, “inconvenience”, “insult”, “hatred”, “ill will” and “needless anxiety”.
That change is legally significant. Under the former provision, the statutory language potentially reached communications associated with a wide range of emotional or social consequences. Under the amended section 24(1), knowingly false communications are connected to substantially more serious statutory circumstances, including a breakdown of law and order or a threat to life. Consider the distinction.
“The government’s economic policy is disastrous.” Ordinarily, that is an opinion concerning public policy. Compare it with: “A bomb has been planted at the National Assembly,”
Where the publisher knows the statement to be false and deliberately communicates it for one of the purposes contemplated by section 24(1)(b). The first is political criticism. The second potentially engages the criminal law because it falls within a statutory framework concerned with false communications and public safety. The law must be capable of distinguishing between them.
5.0 SECTION 24(1) MUST NOT BE CONFUSED WITH SECTION 24(2)
This is perhaps the most important statutory distinction in the contemporary debate. The 2024 amendment changed section 24(1), but section 24(2) continues to create separate offences relating to specified forms of cyberstalking and threatening
communications.
Section 24(2)(a) addresses communication used to bully, threaten or harass another person where the communication places that person in fear of death, violence or bodily harm.
Section 24(2)(b) addresses, among other things, threats to kidnap or harm a person and communications involving ransom or
extortion.
Section 24(2)(c) addresses communications containing threats to harm the property or reputation of the addressee or another person, or threats to accuse the addressee or another person of a crime, where the communication is used to extort money or something of value. The provision carries a separate penalty under subsection 24(2)(c)(ii).
The provision should therefore not be understood as criminalising criticism merely because it damages or threatens reputation. The statutory connection with extortion is material and must be
established in any prosecution brought under the provision.
“The legal ingredients differ.” Criminal liability cannot be established merely because a publication is false, offensive, embarrassing or damaging to reputation. The prosecution must prove the particular statutory offence charged and every essential ingredient of that offence beyond reasonable doubt.
6.0 CRITICISM IS NOT THE SAME AS THREAT
One of the most important distinctions in cybercrime enforcement is the distinction between criticism and threat.
A citizen may state: “The government has failed to address unemployment.” That is criticism.
A citizen may say: “The Minister should resign.” That is political advocacy.
A journalist may write: “The agency’s management of public funds requires investigation.” That is public-interest commentary.
These statements may be harsh. They may embarrass government officials. They may generate political controversy. But none is, by that fact alone, equivalent to a threat.
Now consider: “I will kill the Minister tomorrow.” That is fundamentally different.
A genuine threat to life engages a different legal interest and may properly attract criminal regulation. The State therefore has a legitimate interest in preventing threats, harassment and communications that place individuals in genuine fear of violence or bodily harm. The mistake would be to treat every unpleasant, aggressive or strongly worded political opinion as equivalent to a genuine threat.
7.0 THE IMPORTANCE OF CRITICISM OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS
Public officials exercise public power. They administer public resources, make decisions affecting citizens and perform functions
created by law. Their conduct must therefore be open to legitimate public scrutiny. This does not mean that public officials lose all protection for their reputation, dignity or privacy. Rather, it means that holding public office inevitably exposes the exercise of public functions to greater public discussion.
In Gomes v Punch (Nig.) Ltd (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt. 602) 303, the Supreme Court recognised the importance of public scrutiny of persons holding public office. The principle is important to democratic accountability: public office cannot reasonably be treated as a shield against legitimate criticism of public conduct.
Similarly, Okoduwa v State (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 76) 333 illustrates the distinction between legitimate criticism of judicial conduct and contempt. The case should, however, be treated as an analogy rather than as a direct cybercrime authority. The
broader democratic principle remains compelling: if citizens cannot question persons exercising public power, meaningful accountability becomes difficult.
8.0 FAIR COMMENT AND PUBLIC INTEREST
The law of defamation also recognises the importance of public-interest commentary.
A distinction must be drawn between an assertion of fact and an expression of opinion. Consider:
“In my opinion, the agency’s handling of the investigation was incompetent.” This is primarily evaluative. Compare with “The Director collected ₦20 million to order an assault on a particular person.” The second statement presents a specific allegation of
fact. If such an allegation is published as fact, questions of truth, justification, privilege, malice and other applicable principles of defamation law may arise.
In Abalaka v Akinsete (2023) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1901) 343, the Supreme Court considered principles relating to fair comment and public-interest expression. The case reinforces the importance of distinguishing
an honestly held comment from an unsupported factual allegation.
The point is not that calling something “my opinion” automatically provides legal immunity. A person cannot convert a factual allegation into protected opinion merely by attaching the words “in my opinion” to it. What matters is the substance and context of the communication.
9.0 THE CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE: SECTION 39 AND SECTION 45
Freedom of expression is fundamental, but it is not absolute. Section 45(1) of the Constitution provides that nothing in sections 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 shall invalidate
a law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society:
(a) in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health; or
(b) for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom of other persons.
Section 45 therefore recognises a constitutional mechanism through which certain restrictions on protected rights may be justified.
The question is not simply whether the State has an interest. The question is whether the restriction falls within the constitutional framework.
Aviomoh v C.O.P. (2022) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1819) 69 is relevant to this discussion. The case arose in the context of criminal defamation and the interaction between criminal law and freedom of expression. The Supreme Court did not finally declare the criminal
defamation provisions unconstitutional; rather, the Court considered the constitutional question in the context of the particular proceedings and declined to strike down the law at that stage.
It is therefore safer and more accurate not to present Aviomoh as a simple Supreme Court declaration that every restriction on
expression is valid or that every restriction must automatically survive a general proportionality test.
The better proposition is this: Section 39 protects expression, while section 45 recognises circumstances in which legislation restricting that right may be
constitutionally permissible. The validity and application of the particular restriction must therefore be assessed in its proper legal and factual context.
Section 45 should therefore not be treated as an automatic justification for every restriction imposed upon freedom of expression. The particular restriction must be examined in its legal and factual context.
10.0 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AVIOMOH
The significance of Aviomoh for cybercrime litigation lies in the need to examine the actual statutory provision, the conduct alleged and the constitutional right affected.
A constitutional challenge should therefore be assessed in light of the precise legal and factual circumstances before the court.
At the same time, Aviomoh should not be interpreted as a licence for unlimited criminalisation of speech. The constitutional balance requires courts to consider:
the statutory provision invoked;
the conduct alleged;
the purpose of the restriction;
the constitutional right affected; and
the factual circumstances in which the restriction is being applied.
The mere existence of section 45 does not mean that every restriction imposed in the name of public order or protection of reputation is automatically constitutional.
11.0 CONSTRUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE CRITICISM
The digital environment makes the distinction between constructive and destructive criticism particularly important. Constructive criticism may include:
questioning the conduct of a public officer;
challenging a government policy;
demanding accountability for public
expenditure;
reporting suspected misconduct;
calling for an investigation into alleged corruption;
expressing an honestly held opinion on a matter of public interest; and
demanding the resignation of an official.
Such expression contributes to democratic participation.
“On the other hand, what may be described for the purposes of this article as ‘destructive criticism’ may involve:”
deliberately fabricating allegations;
knowingly disseminating false information where the relevant statutory ingredients are established;
manufacturing evidence;
impersonating public institutions;
fabricating official documents;
making genuine threats;
using threats to extort money; or
engaging in conduct satisfying the elements of a specific statutory offence.
The critical legal question is therefore not merely whether the publication was “destructive”. The court must examine what was communicated, how it was communicated, the applicable statutory provision, the mental element required, the surrounding circumstances and whether the prosecution has established every constituent element of the alleged offence.
12.0 PUBLIC INTEREST IS NOT A LICENCE TO DEFAME
The fact that a publication concerns a government institution does not automatically make every statement concerning that institution lawful. Citizens should be free to ask:
How are public funds being spent?
Why was a person arrested?
Was due process followed?
Has an official abused public office?
Why has an investigation not been conducted?
Why has a public project failed?
Should an official resign?
These questions are essential to democratic accountability. But there is a legal difference between: “The conduct of the agency raises serious questions that require investigation.” and: “The official collected ₦20 million to order an assault.”
The second is a specific factual allegation. If presented without sufficient factual basis, it may raise serious legal consequences under applicable defamation law and, depending on the circumstances and statutory ingredients, potentially other laws. Public interest therefore protects legitimate discussion of public affairs; it does not create a general licence to defame.
13.0 TRUTH, OPINION AND RESPONSIBLE PUBLICATION
Truth remains an important safeguard in responsible communication. Where a serious allegation is published as fact, the publisher should be able to distinguish between:
what is established;
what is alleged;
what is supported by evidence; and
what remains unverified.
This distinction is particularly important on social media. A publication that previously might have reached a few hundred newspaper readers can now reach millions within minutes. The law of defamation recognises relevant principles including justification, fair comment and privilege, depending upon the facts.
In African Newspapers of Nigeria Ltd v Coker (1973) 5 SC 257, the Supreme Court considered principles relating to fair comment and its factual foundation.
Similarly, Mainstreet Bank Ltd v Binna (2016) 47 WRN 1 is relevant to the relationship between qualified privilege and malice.
The fundamental lesson is simple: Freedom of expression protects the right to communicate; it does not create a general right to invent facts.
14.0 ALLEGATIONS MUST BE DISTINGUISHED FROM PROVEN FACTS
One of the most responsible ways of communicating alleged wrongdoing is to distinguish allegations from established facts. Compare: “I have information suggesting that this official may have
engaged in misconduct. I call upon the appropriate authority to investigate.” with: “This official committed the offence.”
The first recognises that investigation and adjudication remain functions of competent institutions. The second presents an unresolved allegation as an established fact.
The distinction is important where criminal allegations are involved.
Section 36(5) of the Constitution provides that every person charged with a criminal offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty. Accordingly, journalists, bloggers, activists, citizens and even public institutions should exercise care when describing persons who have merely been arrested, accused or charged. An accused person is not necessarily a guilty person.
15.0 THE RECENT EFCC PROSECUTIONS AND THE LIMITS OF THE DEBATE
The recent proceedings involving Maryam Isah Shehu and Abubakar Shuraim Abdulhamad in August 2026 as reported by the Punch Newspaper provide a contemporary illustration of the difficulty involved in drawing the boundary between digital criticism and cybercrime. On 20
August 2026, the two were arraigned before the Federal High Court in Abuja over separate social-media publications concerning the EFCC.
Reports of the proceedings stated that Shehu was charged over an Instagram publication alleging that EFCC officials assaulted Ahmed Uthman under the instruction of a Zonal Director who allegedly collected ₦20 million
from another person. Abdulhamad was separately charged concerning an allegedly fabricated image designed to resemble an official EFCC arrest placard and posted on X.
Significantly, the reported charge against Shehu was brought under section 24(2)(c) rather than section 24(1). That distinction is legally important. Section 24(2)(c) is not simply a general prohibition against damaging the reputation of a person or institution. Its language concerns specified threats to reputation or threats to accuse a
person of a crime in circumstances involving an attempt to extort money or something of value.
The public debate surrounding the case therefore needed to focus carefully on the precise charge and its statutory ingredients rather than simply describing the case as “criminalising criticism”. There is, however, an important development that must now be included in any current discussion of the matter.
On 21 August 2026, Vanguard Newspaper reported that the EFCC announced that its Executive Chairman, Ola Olukoyede, had directed the withdrawal of the charges against Shehu and Abdulhamad following appeals and an apology from Shehu’s father. The Commission nevertheless maintained that it regarded the alleged conduct as falling within section 24(2)(c).
The proceedings therefore should not presently be presented as a pending trial in which the defendants’ guilt or innocence remains to be determined. The charges were subsequently withdrawn following the EFCC Chairman’s directive. Nevertheless, the episode remains legally significant. It raises questions concerning:
The proper interpretation of section 24(2)(c);
The distinction between reputation-based criticism and extortion;
The appropriate institutional response to alleged online misconduct;
The limits of cybercrime enforcement; and the importance of ensuring that criminal provisions are applied according to their precise statutory ingredients.
The episode demonstrates why legal analysis must go beyond headlines. Neither “criticising EFCC is a crime” nor “everything published against EFCC is protected speech” is a satisfactory legal proposition. The correct inquiry must always be: what offence does the law actually define, what are its ingredients, and has the alleged conduct satisfied them?
16.0 CAN A GOVERNMENT INSTITUTION BE CRITICISED?
Yes. A democratic government cannot logically demand public accountability while treating criticism of public institutions as inherently criminal. Government institutions exercise public functions. Their decisions affect citizens. Their officials administer public resources. Their conduct may therefore legitimately become the subject of public discussion. A citizen should ordinarily be able to say:
“The agency has failed.”
“The agency should investigate this allegation.”
“The government has mishandled this policy.”
“The official should resign.”
“The conduct of this institution requires public scrutiny.”
The fact that these statements may embarrass, anger or inconvenience public officials does not, without more, transform them into cybercrime. This is consistent with the constitutional protection of expression and the principle recognised in Nigerian authorities concerning public-interest commentary.
17.0 BUT FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IS NOT IMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY
The opposite extreme is equally dangerous. Freedom of expression cannot be used as a blanket shield for genuine criminal conduct.
A person who makes a genuine threat to kill another cannot simply invoke section 39.
A person who uses online communication to extort money through threats cannot automatically rely upon freedom of expression.
A person who fabricates an official document and uses it to deceive others cannot necessarily transform the conduct into protected criticism merely by describing it as political commentary.
Similarly, where a prosecution establishes every ingredient of a valid offence under the Cybercrimes Act, the fact that the defendant’s conduct was politically motivated does not automatically create immunity. The internet is a medium of communication. It is not a legal sanctuary.
18.0 SECTION 45 AND THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATION
“Beyond identifying a legitimate government interest, the application of criminal law to digital expression requires careful attention to whether the particular restriction is constitutionally justified under section 45.”
What harm is the law attempting to prevent?
What legitimate interest is being protected?
What exactly does the statutory provision prohibit?
Are the statutory ingredients sufficiently clear?
Is the criminal law being applied to the conduct actually prohibited?
Is the interference with expression justified by the legitimate objective?
Is the enforcement response proportionate to the alleged conduct?
These questions are particularly important when criminal law is used against communications concerning public officials.
A government institution has an interest in protecting its legitimate operations and preventing threats, extortion and malicious deception. But the existence of that interest does not mean that every criticism of the institution is criminal.
19.0 THE DANGER OF USING CYBERCRIME LAW AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR CENSORSHIP
The greatest danger in this area is not the existence of cybercrime legislation itself. Nigeria genuinely needs effective cybercrime legislation. The danger arises when criminal law becomes a response to institutional discomfort rather than legally defined criminal conduct.
A law intended to protect citizens from genuine cyber threats should not become an instrument for silencing journalists, activists, students or ordinary citizens merely because they have criticised persons in authority. The distinction is fundamental.
If a publication constitutes a genuine threat, the criminal law may intervene.
If it constitutes extortion, the law may intervene.
If it involves impersonation, fabrication or another established statutory offence, prosecution may be justified.
If it is defamatory, the applicable civil or criminal law, where constitutionally and statutorily available, must be properly considered.
But where the complaint is simply that a citizen criticised the performance of a public institution, the mere discomfort caused by that criticism should not itself become the basis for criminal prosecution.
20.0 RESPONSIBLE DIGITAL SPEECH
The protection of freedom of expression should not be interpreted as an invitation to irresponsible publication. Citizens should exercise their rights carefully. Before publishing a serious allegation, a responsible digital communicator should ask:
Is the information verified?
Do I have evidence?
Am I expressing an opinion or asserting a fact?
Have I clearly identified an allegation as an allegation?
Am I deliberately spreading false information?
Am I threatening anyone?
Am I encouraging violence?
Could the publication amount to defamation or another offence?
Is there a responsible authority to which the allegation can also be reported?
These questions do not weaken freedom of expression. They strengthen responsible citizenship. But responsibility must not become another word for censorship. A society can encourage responsible speech without criminalising every irresponsible statement.
21.0 THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN-RIGHTS DIMENSION
Nigeria’s international and regional human-rights obligations reinforce the importance of freedom of expression.
Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights protects the right to receive information and the right to express and disseminate opinions. The African
Charter forms part of Nigerian domestic law by virtue of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act and is therefore relevant to the domestic protection of freedom of expression.
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) likewise protects freedom of expression while recognising that restrictions may be imposed in specified circumstances, including for respect for the rights or reputations of others and the protection of national security, public order, public health or morals.
The international framework therefore reflects the same fundamental principle found in sections 39 and 45 of the Nigerian Constitution: Freedom of expression is fundamental, but restrictions must have a legitimate legal basis and must be directed toward recognised interests. The objective should therefore be balance rather than the destruction of one right in favour of another.
22.0 THE PROPER LEGAL TEST FOR ONLINE CRITICISM
In determining whether online criticism has crossed the boundary into criminal conduct, law-enforcement agencies and courts should avoid relying merely upon the emotional effect of the publication. A more principled approach requires several questions.
First: What exactly was communicated? The precise words, images, videos or other material must be identified.
Second: Was it fact or opinion? An opinion should not automatically be treated as a factual allegation.
Third: What offence is alleged? The prosecution must identify the precise statutory provision under which the defendant is charged.
Fourth: What are the ingredients of that offence? The court must examine the actual statutory elements rather than relying on broad labels such as “cyberbullying”, “tarnishing reputation” or “malicious publication”.
Fifth: What was the required mental element? Where the offence requires knowledge, intention, purpose or another mental element, the prosecution must establish the relevant requirement.
Sixth: What harm or consequence does the statute require? There is a substantial legal difference between causing embarrassment and threatening death, violence or extortion.
Seventh: Is the conduct protected expression? The court should consider the relationship between the alleged criminal conduct and section 39 of the Constitution.
Eighth: Is the restriction constitutionally justified? Section 45 must be considered where applicable.
Ninth: Has the prosecution established every ingredient beyond reasonable doubt? This remains fundamental to criminal justice.
The emotional reaction of an institution to a publication cannot replace proof of the ingredients of an offence.
23.0 WHY THE DISTINCTION MATTERS
The distinction between constructive criticism and destructive conduct is not merely academic. It affects democracy.
If legitimate criticism is routinely criminalised, citizens may become afraid to question government.
If genuine threats, extortion, deliberate deception and other criminal conduct are ignored merely because they are presented
as “free speech”, citizens may lose confidence in the ability of law to protect them. The answer therefore lies in distinguishing:
criticism from threats;
opinion from fact;
allegation from proof;
investigation from conviction;
public interest from character assassination;
responsible journalism from fabrication; and
lawful dissent from criminal conduct.
That is the balance the law should seek.
24.0 CONCLUSION: CYBERCRIME MUST NOT BECOME A SUBSTITUTE FOR CENSORSHIP
Nigeria unquestionably needs effective cybercrime legislation. The internet has become a powerful instrument for fraud, identity theft, cyberstalking, extortion, threats, impersonation and other forms of criminality. The State therefore has both the
authority and responsibility to regulate unlawful digital conduct. But the fight against cybercrime must not become a fight against criticism.
A citizen who exposes alleged corruption should not automatically be treated as a cybercriminal.
A journalist who investigates government expenditure should not be criminalised merely because the investigation embarrasses an official.
An activist who criticises government policy should not be arrested merely because the criticism is harsh.
At the same time, a person who deliberately threatens another’s life, uses communication for extortion, fabricates material for deceptive purposes or otherwise satisfies the statutory ingredients of a criminal offence cannot claim immunity merely because the conduct occurred online. The distinction must therefore remain clear.
Criticism is not automatically cybercrime.
Political disagreement is not automatically cybercrime.
An offensive opinion is not automatically a criminal offence.
But neither does the internet provide immunity for genuine criminal conduct. The 2024 amendment to section 24 is significant because it substantially changed section 24(1), removing several of the broad expressions contained in the original provision and replacing them with a narrower statutory formulation concerning pornography and knowingly false communications made for specified purposes relating to public order and threats to life.
At the same time, section 24(2) remains important. Its provisions concerning cyberstalking, threats and extortion must be analysed independently of section 24(1). In particular, section 24(2)(c) contains a specific statutory connection between threats concerning reputation or accusations of crime and extortion.
The recent EFCC proceedings demonstrate why this distinction matters. Maryam Isah Shehu and Abubakar Shuraim Abdulhamad were arraigned on 20 August 2026 over separate social-media publications and were reportedly charged under section 24(2)(c). The charges, however, were withdrawn on
21 August 2026 following the EFCC Chairman’s directive.
The episode should therefore not be used as proof that criticism of the EFCC has been judicially declared a cybercrime. No such judicial determination was made. Rather, it provides a useful case study of the importance of precise statutory interpretation and responsible exercise of prosecutorial power.
Similarly, Solomon Okedara v Attorney-
General of the Federation remains an important historical authority because the Court of Appeal considered the constitutionality of the original section 24(1) and upheld it. But the decision must be read against the legislative amendment that subsequently changed the wording of section 24.
The ultimate protection of freedom of expression depends not merely upon the words contained in legislation. It also depends upon how investigators exercise their powers, how prosecutors select cases and how courts interpret and enforce statutory provisions.
A democracy must be strong enough to tolerate criticism. Indeed, the ability of citizens to question those who govern them is one of the characteristics that distinguishes constitutional democracy from authoritarian government.
The State should therefore fight cybercrime vigorously, but it must not confuse the discomfort of being criticised with the criminality of the person doing the criticising.
The proper constitutional balance is neither that everything said online is permissible nor that everything offensive online is criminal. It is this:
Protect expression.
Prosecute genuine criminality.
Demand proof.
Respect due process.
Interpret criminal statutes according to their actual words.
Protect public institutions without turning them into institutions beyond criticism.
The internet needs law.
Citizens need protection.
Victims need justice.
But democracy also needs dissent. The challenge for Nigerian law is therefore to ensure that, in protecting society from cybercrime, it does not criminalise the very freedom of expression that constitutional democracy exists to protect.
ABOUT THE WRITER
Jacob Shekwobashawye Samuel is
a Senator of the 9th Legislative Assembly under the Law Students’ Association of Nigeria (LAWSAN).
He is a passionate law student with a strong commitment to legal scholarship and public discourse.
He is a legal Reasoner, Researcher, Drafter, Writer, known for his analytical approach to contemporary legal issues.
His work spans legal articles, opinions, commentaries, research papers, Critical reviews and legal enlightenment many of which are accessible online.
His writing focuses on the intersection of law, Society, The Economy, administration of Justice, Creativity, Governance and Digital Culture, where he examines emerging legal issues and offers thought-provoking insights.
Through his Work, he seeks to challenge assumptions and promote critical legal thinking that resolves legal challenges and promote legal relationships.
He can be reached via:
LinkedIn,
Email: samueljacobs1302@gmail.com
Whatsap: +2349033955433
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