By Collins Okeke and Gukongozi Esther
For weeks, Nigerians have protested outside the National Assembly over proposed amendments to the Electoral Act 2022. At the centre of this controversy is a technical but crucial question: how should election results be transmitted from polling units to collation centres? The answer to this question will determine the credibility of Nigeria’s 2027 general elections and potentially every election thereafter.
The current legal framework
The Electoral Act 2022 governs how elections are conducted in Nigeria, but its provisions on result transmission are notably vague. Section 60(5) of the Act states that “the presiding officer shall transfer the results including total number of accredited voters and the results of the ballot in a manner as prescribed by the Commission.”This language gives the Independent National Electoral Commission complete discretion over how results move from polling units to collation centres.
The law uses the word “transfer” rather than any specific method of transmission. It makes no mention of electronic systems, the internet, or INE’s Result Viewing Portal known as IReV. Most significantly, it leaves the entire process to INEC’s operational guidelines rather than creating statutory requirements. Section 50(2) reinforces this discretion by stating that “voting at an election and transmission of results under this Act shall be in accordance with the procedure determined by the Commission.”
During the 2023 general elections, INEC deployed electronic transmission technology and uploaded many polling unit results to the IReV portal. Citizens could watch results appear in real time on their phones. But when disputes arose and cases reached the Supreme Court, justices ruled that electronic transmission was unknown to law. Because the Electoral Act did not mandate electronic transmission, INEC had discretion to use it or not, and courts could not compel the commission to rely on electronically transmitted results over manual paper forms.
This created a fundamental problem. Nigeria had invested in technology and raised citizens’ expectations about transparency, but the legal framework made electronic transmission optional rather than mandatory. The law permitted INEC to use modern methods but did not require it, leaving electoral outcomes vulnerable to the same manipulation tactics that had plagued Nigerian democracy for decades.
The proposed reform
After the 2023 elections exposed these gaps, the National Assembly Committees on Electoral Matters examined the issue and recommended amendments. The committees’ initial proposal for a new Section 60(3) contained three key elements: mandatory electronic transmission of results, explicit reference to the IREV portal, and a requirement for real-time upload whilst witnesses remained present at polling units.
This proposal represented a fundamental shift from discretionary to mandatory electronic transmission. The phrase “shall electronically transmit” made it obligatory rather than optional. The specific mention of “IREV portal” identified the exact platform by name in the statute. Most critically, the inclusion of “in real time” required immediate upload whilst witnesses remained present at the polling unit, before anyone could alter results during transportation to collation centres.
Under this proposal, presiding officers would have had no choice about whether to use electronic transmission. They would have been legally required to upload results immediately after counting and signing forms. The narrow window for compliance would have closed whilst polling agents, party representatives, and citizens were still present to verify that uploaded results matched what had been announced. This real-time requirement was the key provision that would have transformed Nigerian elections by eliminating the opportunity for result manipulation between polling units and collation centres.
What the senate actually adopted
When the Electoral Act Amendment Bill came before the Senate for consideration on 4 February 2026, senators initially rejected the committees’ proposal and voted to retain the existing Section 60(5) language from the 2022 Act. The decision sparked nationwide protests and fierce criticism from civil society organisations. Faced with public outrage, the Senate convened an emergency session on 10 February, and the Senate passed a revised version of Clause 60(3).
The Senate’s adopted provision now reads: “The presiding officer shall electronically transmit the results from each polling unit to the IREV portal and such transmission shall be done after the prescribed Form EC8A has been signed and stamped by the presiding officer and/or countersigned by the candidates or polling agents where available at the polling units. Provided that if the electronic transmission of the results fails as a result of communication failure, the result contained in Form EC8A signed by the presiding officer and/or countersigned by the polling agents shall, in such a case, be the primary source of collation and declaration of results.”
This version makes three critical changes from the committees’ recommendation. First, it removes the phrase “in real time,” meaning presiding officers must electronically transmit results but not necessarily immediately whilst witnesses are present. Second, it creates an exception for “communication failure” without defining what constitutes such failure or what proof is required. Third, it designates manual Form EC8A as ‘the primary source” when electronic transmission allegedly fails, effectively creating a hierarchy where paper results can override electronic records.
Legal implications of the Senate’s position
The removal of “in real time” from the Senate’s version fundamentally weakens the provision’s effectiveness. Without a time requirement, presiding officers can leave polling units with paper forms, and nothing in the law compels them to upload results within any specific timeframe. A presiding officer could theoretically wait hours or even days before transmitting results electronically. During this delay window, opportunities arise for external pressure, bribery, or coercion to alter results before they are uploaded.
The phrase creates ambiguity about when compliance has occurred. If a presiding officer uploads results six hours after counting concluded, has he fulfilled his legal obligation to “electronically transmit” results? Under the Senate’s language, arguably yes, because there’s no temporal requirement. This stands in sharp contrast to the original proposal where “real time” would have required upload within minutes whilst witnesses could verify accuracy.
The communication failure exception presents even more serious legal problems. The provision states that if electronic transmission “fails as a result of communication failure,” manual results become primary, but it nowhere defines what constitutes communication failure.
Does it mean complete absence of network coverage? Weak signal strength? Server congestion? Equipment malfunction? Human error in operating devices? Deliberate network sabotage? The statute is silent.
This definitional gap creates significant evidentiary challenges. When disputes arise over whether electronic or manual results should prevail, tribunals will face questions the law doesn’t answer. What standard of proof applies to claims of communication failure? Must presiding officers provide contemporaneous documentation? Are witness statements sufficient? Should independent technical verification be required? Without statutory guidance, different tribunals may apply inconsistent standards, creating legal uncertainty and unpredictability.
To be continued tomorrow.
Okeke is partner and head of government relations and public sector practice at Olisa Agbakoba Legal and Gukongozi is an associate at Olisa Agbakoba Legal.
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