By Legalpedia

M. L. MANDE ENTERPRISES LTD V. THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH IN NIGERIA & ORS

APPEAL NO: CA/A/637/2018

Legalpedia Citation: (2022-05) Legalpedia 03915 (CA)

AREAS OF LAW:

Action, Appeal, Court, Criminal Law And Procedure, Judgment And Order, Land Law, Law Of Evidence, Limitation Law, Practice And Procedure, Statute Of Limitation

SUMMARY OF FACTS:

The Appellant was the original allottee of the land in dispute situate at Plot 849, Cadastral Zone, Durumi District, Abuja and did not at any time alienate same to one Mr. Benjamin Ochai or any other person and therefore, remained the owner of the said land in dispute.

However, the 1st Respondent alleged that the Appellant had for monetary consideration, through late Alhaji Mande, sold the said plot of land to one Mr. Benjamin Ochai in1998, who in turn had vide an irrevocable Power of Attorney sold the said plot of land in 1999 to one Mrs. Cecilia Onuiri, who in turn sold the same to the 1st Respondent in 2000, who proceeded to take steps to perfect its interest before the emergence of the Appellant to interfere with the process.

The Appellant denied that its late Managing Director, one late Alhaji Mande, ever in his life time conveyed its interest to the 1st Respondent to warrant the process of perfecting title by the 1st Respondent since the Appellant had remained the owner of the said land having never transferred its ownership of the said land to any person, including all or any of the 1st Respondent’s predecessors in title.

Hence, the Appellant commenced this action for declaration of title in respect of the land in dispute, before the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, vide a Writ of Summons and a Further Amended Statement of Claim wherein he sought for declaratory and injunctive reliefs, amongst other reliefs. In reaction, upon service of the processes, the 1st Respondent filed an Amended Statement of Defense and Counter – Claim.

At the end of the trial, the lower Court in its judgment, dismissed the claims of the Appellant against the Respondents for lacking in merit, while part of the counter – claim of the 1st Respondent was granted against the Appellant.

Aggrieved by the judgment, the Appellant has appealed against same vide his Notice of Appeal containing eight (8) Grounds of Appeal.

HELD:

Appeal Dismissed

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

Ø Whether from the state of pleadings and evidence, the Court below correctly admitted an unregistered deed of assignment (Exhibit D15) same having been pleaded and put in evidence as a document conferring and evidencing title in favor of 1sl Respondent?

Ø Whether Exhibits D15, D16 and D17 are admissible in evidence having failed to satisfy the provisions of Sections 102 (b) and 104 of the Evidence Act, 2011 which require certification of private documents in public custody and Section 84 of the Evidence Act2011, being a mandatory requirement for certification of Computer – generated documents?

Ø Whether the Court below was right to have admitted Exhibit D16 in evidence in view of its reliance on the decision in Abu V. Kuyabana (2002) 4 NWLR (Pt. 748) 599 @ p. 614 and Section 2 of Land Registration Act, Cap. 515. LFN, 1990 (Abuja)?

Ø Whether the Court was right in ignoring or downplaying the importance of the fact of collection of the Certificate of Occupancy and went ahead to reach a conclusion that PW1admitted the fact of collection of the Certificate of Occupancy in the custody of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents?

Ø Whether the Court below was right in refusing to take note of clear acts of illegalities or irregularities in the course of proceedings?

Ø Whether or not the Court below was correct in improperly evaluating 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ evidence and ascribing probative value to the pieces of evidence thereof?

Ø From the peculiar circumstance of this case and totality of evidence and facts placed before the Court below, whether it was right in placing reliance on the Limitation Act, Cap. 522, LFN, 1990 (Abuja) and invoking the doctrine(s) of laches and acquiescence in giving judgement in favor of the 1st Respondent?

RATIONES

REPLY BRIEF – WHAT A REPLY BRIEF SHOULD NOT BE USED FOR

“The reply brief, it must be reiterated is not and cannot be an avenue for an Appellant to re – argue his appeal or merely to have a second bite at the cherry. See Order 19 Rules 5 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021. See Olafisoye V. FRN 2004 1SC Pt. 11 27; Ikine V. Edjerode (2001) 12 SC (Pt. 11) 94; Longe V. FBN (2010) 2 – 3 SC 61; Registered Trustees, Ikoyi Club 1938 V. Mr. Timothy Ikujuni (2019) LPELR – 47373 (CA). -PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A

PERIOD OF LIMITATION – PERIOD FOR COMMENCING AN ACTION ON RECOVERY OF LAND IN DISPUTE

“Now, by Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act, Cap 522, LFN (Abuja) 1990, it is provided thus:

“No action by a person to recover land (a) shall subject to paragraph (b) of this subsection, be brought after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the person bringing it or if it first accrued to some person through whom he claims, to that person”.

The law is that an action involving declaration of title by way of claim for recovery of land shall be commenced before the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the right of action accrued. PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A

LIMITATION OF ACTION –STATUS OF AN ACTION COMMENCED OUTSIDE THE LIMITATION PERIOD

“In law, and the parties are ad idem, the issue of limitation of action is a threshold question of jurisdictional competence and can even be raised at any stage and even suo motu by the Court. Thus, once it is found that an action had been commenced outside the limitation period prescribed by law, such an action is said to be statute bared, stale and thus, dead on arrival. It leaves the cause of action of such a Claimant bare and unenforceable in a Court of law. This is to obviate the need for Defendant to grapple with claims which have become stale and for which material documents and other relevant evidence might have been lost. See Section 15 (2) of the Limitation Act, Cap 522 LFN (Abuja) 1990. See also Nwadiaro V. Shell Development Coy. Ltd (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 150) 322 @ pp. 337 – 339, where this Court per Kolawole JCA had stated inert alia thus:

“One of the principles of the Statute of Limitation is that those who go to sleep on their claims should not be assisted by the courts in recovering their property. But another equally important principle is that there shall be an end of these matters, and that there shall be an end to stale demands”.

See further Amata V. Omofuma (1997) 2 NWLR (PT. 485) P. 93 @ p. 113; Obiefuna V. Okoye (1961) 1 SCNLR 144; Nwadiaro V. Shell Development Coy. Ltd (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 150) 322 @ pp. 337 – 338; P. N. Udoh Trading Co. Ltd V. Abere (2001) 11 NWLR (723) 114; Angadi V. PDP (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1641) 1″. -PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A

LIMITATION OF ACTION – FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF LIMITATION OF ACTION AND ITS APPLICATION

“Indeed, in law the question of limitation of action is a threshold issue which affects the jurisdiction of the Court and therefore, its application cannot be limited to specific pleadings and or the rules of Court. It can even be raised viva voce, since no Court has the competence to adjudicate the merit of a cause or matter which is incompetent before it no matter its zeal to render substantial justice on the merit. Indeed, jurisdiction is the epicentre and soul of adjudication. See Ajayi V. Adebiy1 (2013) 3 WRN 1, where the Supreme Court per Adekeye JSC had stated inter alia thus:

“Limitation Law and Locus Standi are both threshold issues which can be raised anytime or for the first in the Court of Appeal or in the Supreme Court. It is not limited to being raised as a special defence and pleading them specifically as required by the Rules of Court…..It transcends any High Court Rules. It can be raised by preliminary objection at any stage of the proceedings before any court by any of the parties or even suo motu by the Court.”

See also P. N. Udoh Trading Co. Ltd V. Abere (2001) LPELR – 2893 (SC); Sulgrave Holdings Inc & Ors V. FGN & Ors (2012) LPELR – 15520 (SC); Egbe V. Adefarasin (No. 1) (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 3) 540. -PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A

PERIOD OF LIMITATION – RATIONALE FOR THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION

“My lords, the law considers all claims commenced after the limitation period as stale and as dead and thus awaits the summons from on high on the resurrection day but until then it remains stale and unenforceable in a Court of law. The rationale for this position of the law was explained in greater details by this Court in Ikosi Industries Limited V. Lagos State Government & Ors (2017) LPELR – 41867(CA) per Georgewill JCA, inter alia thus:

“…The rationale for limitation of time for the commencement of action would seem to be that due to the length of time that must have elapsed, a Defendant, on being confronted with a stale claim, may have lost or unavailability of materials evidence or death or unavailability of vital key witnesses, due to no fault of his, necessary for his defense which would have otherwise been available if the claims were commenced timely within the period as allowed under the relevant applicable limitation law”

-PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A

PLEA OF LACHES AND ACQUIESCENCE – ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS A PARTY RELYING ON THE PLEA OF LACHES AND ACQUIESCENCE MUST PLEAD AND PROVE

“My lords, the gist of the plea of laches and acquiescence is knowledge, actual or constructive, of the other party of the adverse long possession of the land in dispute by the party relying on the plea. Thus, the party, as in the instant case the 1stRespondent, relying on the plea of laches and acquiescence must, in order to succeed, not only plead but also lead credible evidence to prove the following essential elements of the plea of laches and acquiescence namely: That the party relying on the plea was in fact mistaken as to his own rights over the land; That the party relying on the plea had in reliance on his mistake expended money on the land; That the other party knew of the existence of his own right which is inconsistent with the right over the land claimed by the party relying on the plea; That the other party knew of the mistaken belief by the party relying on the plea of his right; That the other party encouraged the party relying on the plea expenditure of money. See Moss V. Kenrow (Nig.) Ltd (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 264) 207 @ p. 226. See also Maji V. Shafi (1965) NMLR 33. See also Alade V. Aborishade (1960) SCNLR 398, (1960) 5 FSC 167; Agbon – Ojeme V. Selo – Ojeme & Ors 2020 LPELR – 49688 (CA) @ pp. 78 – 79, per Georgewill JCA. PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A

PLEA OF LACHES AND ACQUIESCENCE – GROUND ON WHICH THE PLEA OF LACHES AND ACQUIESCENCE CAN BE SUCCESSFULLY INVOKED AND APPLIED

“It appears, the Appellant wanted, by its passiveness, the 1st Respondent to fully develop the property, as it did by building its Church, Personage and School thereon, before the Appellant would step forward, as it sought to do by this Suit, to claim both the plot of land in dispute and by implication all these developments affixed to the plot of land in dispute as belonging to whoever is adjudged the owner of the plot of land in dispute. The law as expressed in the land law Latin Maxim is ‘Quid Quid Platantur Solo, Solo Cedit.’ See Anyi & Ors V. Harry Akande & Ors (2017) LPELR – 41973 (CA) per Georegwill JCA. See also Adejumo V. Olawaiye (2014) 31 WRN 30 @ p. 38.

However, it is true in law that for the equitable plea of laches and acquiescence to be successfully invoked and applied, the act of the Claimant must be beyond mere delay to pursue a right. There must also be an incidence of occurrences which shows that the Defendant has taken serious steps towards the res owing to the indolence of the Claimant.- PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A

PROOF OF ALLEGATION OF FRAUD – STANDARD OF PROOF REQUIRED IN AN ALLEGATION OF FRAUD

“Now, on the issue of allegation of fraud as raised by the Appellant as operating against the application of the principles of laches and acquiescence, the law is that an allegation of fraud, even when made in a civil case, and if it be central to the issues joined by the parties, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. On the evidence led, as in the Records of Appeal, I find that the Appellant failed woefully to prove any of its diverse allegations of fraud, illegalities and forgery against all or any of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents. It failed to prove, most importantly, that the signature of Alhaji M. L. Mande, was forged by all or any of the Respondents. Indeed, in law it is one thing to allege a crime, including fraud, but quite another thing to prove it by credible evidence beyond reasonable doubts as required by law. – PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A

ADDRESS OF COUNSEL – WHETHER ADDRESS OF COUNSEL CAN TAKE THE PLACE OF EVIDENCE

“It has become settled law that no matter how brilliant a counsel address might be, it can neither take the place of evidence nor supply evidence not led by the party. So, it is regrettably with all the brilliant submissions of learned counsel for the Appellant not founded on the pleadings and evidence led by the parties as in the Records of Appeal. See Agbon – Ojeme V. Selo – Ojeme & Ors 2020 LPELR – 49688 (CA) @ pp. 78 – 79, per Georgewill JCA.

Truly, the learned counsel for the Appellant was so profound and profuse in reeling out and analysing a plethora of decided cases on the issues of the principles of laches and acquiescence but was very short on the facts as pleaded and proved against the Appellant by the 1st Respondent. The Court below was therefore, right and on firmer ground, when it held that the claim of the Appellant to the title to the land in dispute had become both stale and was also defeated by the finer principles of laches and acquiescence as pleaded and proved against it by the 1st Respondent. In law therefore, the Appellant’s claim was dead on arrival and incapable of any resurrection either by the Appellant or indeed even the Court below. See Igbum V. Nyarinya (2000) LPELR – 9938 (CA). See also Kaiyaoja & Ors V. Egunla (1974) 1 All NLR 426; Dr. Godwill Eromosele Agbon-Ojeme V. Mr. Jude Selo – Ojeme & Ors (2020) LPELR- 49688 (CA) per Georgewill JCA. -PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A

FINDINGS OF A TRIAL COURT – DUTY OF AN APPELLATE COURT NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE CORRECT FINDINGS OF A TRIAL COURT

“In my finding therefore, the 1st Respondents not only pleaded and relied on laches and acquiescence but had also proceeded to prove it by credible evidence against the claims of title to the plot of land in dispute by the Appellant as required of it by law. Consequently, I hold that the Court below was right when it held that the claims of the Appellant to the title to the plot of land in dispute was caught by the doctrine of laches and acquiescence as relied upon by the 1st Respondents, and thereby extinguishing whatever title or right of the Appellant to the plot of land in dispute in favor of the 1st Respondents. This Court being an appellate Court does not make it a habit interfering with correct findings and conclusions of the Court below but rather we do affirm such correct findings and conclusions. See Alhaji Ndayoko & Ors. V. Alhaji Dantoro & Ors. (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 187 @ p. 198. See also Abaye V. Ofili (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 15) 134; Ukejianya V. Uchendu 18 WACA 46. -PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A

STATUTE BARRED ACTION – PROPER ORDER A COURT SHOULD MAKE WHEN A SUIT IS STATUTE BARRED

“My lords, having arrived at the inescapable conclusion that the Appellant’s Suit was filed outside the 12 years limitation period prescribed by law, and thus, statute barred, the issue of the perennial battle for supremacy between ‘substantial justice’ and ‘technical justice’ reared up its head at once to play on the conscience of the Court; should we jettison and discountenance technicality bordering on incompetence of the Appellant’s Suit and consider the other issues in this appeal on the merit or should we give effect to the settled principle of law that nothing worth anything can ever come out from an incompetent Suit? In African Songs Limited & Anor V. King Sunday Adeniyi Adegeye (2019) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1656) 335 @ p. 365 – 366, this Court had cause to consider the place of ‘substantial justice’ and ‘technical justice’ in the due administration of justice in this Country and had per Georgewill JCA, opined inter alia thus:

“My lords, while in today’s jurisprudence of ‘substantial justice’ the issue of ‘mere technicality’ no longer holds sway, yet it is truism that competence is the soul of adjudication. It is in this sense the issue of competence can no longer in law truly be regarded as ‘mere technicality’ but rather be seen as substantial issue of law. In other – words while eschewing technicality for its sake, a Court can only exercise jurisdiction where all conditions precedent to the exercise of its powers have been fulfilled.”

I do not think I can improve on the statement of law I made above and thus, I cannot but bow to it. I fully subscribe to its truism and so it is with the Appellant’s Suit. See Umanah V. Attah (2006) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1009) 503 @ p. 525, where the Supreme Court had per Tobi JSC, (God bless His Soul), reiterated inter alia thus:

“Once a Court lacks jurisdiction…The matter ends there and the only procedural duty of the Court is to strike it out. No more and no less. The position of the law is as hard and as strict as that. The only valid way is to file the action in a court of competent jurisdiction”.

In law, once a Suit is found to be statute barred the proper order to make is one of dismissal. See NPA Plc. V. Lotus Plastics Ltd. & Anor (2005) 19 NWLR (Pt. 959) 258. -PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A

COURT – ATTITUDE OF COURTS TO ISSUES THAT ARE ACADEMIC

“Indeed, the Courts are loath to and do not saddle themselves with the consideration of matters which had become merely academic and therefore, of no utilitarian value to either of the parties. To embark on such exercise of jurisdiction of the Courts over matters which are no longer live would clearly amount to nothing but sheer waste of the very precious and, if I may say scarce, judicial time. See Charles Oke & Anor V. Dr. Rahman Mimiko & Ors(2013) All FWLR (Pt. 693) 1853. See also Uba Plc V. Dana Drugs Ltd (2018) LPELR -44103 (CA), per Georgewill JCA; Mbachu V. Anambra – Imo Rivers Basin Development Authority, Owerri (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 342) 1482 @ p 1497. -PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A

EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE – INSTANCE WHEN THE NEED FOR RE-EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE BY AN APPELLATE COURT WILL ARISE

“My lords, in law when an Appellant alleges that a trial Court had not properly evaluated the evidence led by the parties it is simply a call on the appellate Court to consider first whether or not the trial Court had properly evaluated the evidence led before it and if it finds that the trial Court had not done so, then to proceed to and re – evaluate the evidence in the printed record to determine if the trial Court had made correct findings borne out by the evidence as led by the parties. It is thus the law that it is only where the trial Court had not properly carried out its sacred duty of dispassionately evaluating the totality of the evidence led and had thus failed in this primary duty that an appellate Court would have the legal justification to intervene and re – evaluate the evidence on the printed record in order to make appropriate findings of facts in line with the evidence led and in the dictates of justice to the parties. So, until an appellate Court arrives at such a conclusion the need for re – evaluation of evidence does not arise since an appellate Court has no business interfering with correct findings of a trial Court. See African Songs Limited & Anor V. King Sunny Ade (2018) LPELR – 46184 (CA) per Georgewill JCA. See also Williams V. Tinubu (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 755) 200; Amuneke V. The State (1992) NWLR (Pt. 217)347; Sule Asariyu V. The State (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 67) 709. -PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A

EVIDENCE ELICITED DURING CROSS EXAMINATION – WHETHER EVIDENCE ELICITED DURING CROSS EXAMINATION CAN BE ACTED UPON BY THE COURT

“The law is well settled that evidence elicited in cross examination, as in the instant appeal from the PW1 by the 1st Respondent, which supports the case as pleaded by the 1st Respondent, the cross – examining party, is good evidence on which a trial Court, such as the Court below can legitimately act on to make appropriate findings of facts. See Daggash V. Bulama (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt. 892) 144. -PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A

EVIDENCE OF A WITNESS – WHETHER A WITNESS WHO HAS GIVEN MATERIALLY INCONSISTENT EVIDENCE OR LIED ON OATH CAN BE ASCRIBED WITH CREDIBILITY BY THE COURT

It is settled law that no witness who has given materially inconsistent evidence on oath, and or tell lies on matters within their own personal knowledge before the Court, is entitled to the honour of being ascribed with any credibility by the Court on issues or matters in contention between the parties. See Ogunde V. Abdulsalam (2017) LPELR – 41875 (CA) per Georgewill JCA. See also Ezemba V. Ibeneme (2009) 14 NWLR (Pt 798) 623 -PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE – NATURE OF DOCUMENTS THAT FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF “COMPUTER GENERATED” DOCUMENTS

By Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011, it is provided thus:

“In any proceedings, a statement contained in a document produced by a computer shall be admissible as evidence of any fact stated in it of which direct oral evidence would be admissible, if it is shown that the conditions in subsection (2) of this section are satisfied in relation to the statement and the computer in question.”

The evidence of DW1 that the said D15, D16, and D17 were ‘captured on the 2nd and 3rd Defendants ‘electronic receptacles’ is in my finding not enough to explain the nature of the ‘capture” and thus the fact that a computer captured a document does not ipso facto make the statements in that document computer generated. This is so because, it would appear and I find it so certain, that in such situations as in the Exhibits D15, 16 and D17, documents were already in existence before the electronic receptacle captured them and they were therefore, not computer – generated evidence as envisaged under Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011. It is clear to me and I so hold that Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011 is limited in its scope and operation to only documents which are ‘computer generated’ and not any kind of documents, and thus not applicable to Exhibits D15, D16 and D17 respectively. See Dickson V. Sylva (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1567) 167. See also Mr. Ray Okpu V. Trust Bond Mortgage Bank Plc (2021) LPELR- 54554 (CA) per Georgewill JCA; Jude Onwuzulike V. The State (2017) LPELR – 41889 (CA); Hon. Dickson V. Chief Timipre Sylva & Ors (2016) LPELR – 41257 (SC); Daudu V. FRN 2018 10 NWLR (Pt. 1626) 169; Kubor V. Dickson 2013 4 NWLR Pt. 1345 534.

I have taken a calm look at Exhibits D15, D16 and D17, which original copies were indisputably proved to be missing and therefore, in my finding were not in the custody of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents. They do not form part of the records of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and are therefore, not public documents. So, were they admissible or inadmissible in evidence and were they rightly or wrongly admitted in evidence? In my finding, being documents merely submitted to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents by the 1st Respondent for the processing of its application for recertification and perfection of its title, they did not become and were not public documents. They were also clearly not computer – generated documents by the mere fact that upon their submission they were electronically captured in the receptacle of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents, being documents temporarily submitted as part of the procedure for the perfection of its title. See Section 102 (b); 84 and 104 of the Evidence Act 2011. See also Daniel V. INEC (2015) LPELR – 24566 (SC); Awolola V. Gov. of Ekiti State (2018) LPELR – 46346 (SC); Dickson V. Sylva (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1567) 167; Mr. Aruna V. Hajia Kuburatu Ibrahim (2021) LPELR- 54137 (CA) per Georegwill JCA; Guaranty Trust Bank V. Tabik Investment Ltd & Anor (2005) 3 FWLR (Pt. 217) 301 @ p. 311.-PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A

ADMISSIBILITY OF DOCUMENT- WHETHER AN UNREGISTERED REGISTRABLE INSTRUMENT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE

“Now, it seems so very clear and certain to me that going by the pleadings and evidence led by the 1st Respondent through PW1 and PW2, Exhibit D15, was tendered by the 1st Respondent merely as evidence of payment of purchase same, same as Exhibits D16 and D17 and in proof of its equitable right over the land in dispute. In law these documents are ordinarily registrable instrument and if tendered as documents of title must be registered to be admissible in evidence. However, having been pleaded and tendered as merely evidence of payment of purchase price in support of equitable title, they need not be registered to be admissible in evidence and I so firmly hold”. PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A

EQUITABLE INTEREST IN LAND – INSTANCES WHEN A PURCHASER OF LAND OR A LESSEE IN POSSESSION OF LAND ACQUIRES EQUITABLE INTEREST IN LAND

“In law, a document pleaded and tendered as mere evidence of payment for a land transaction as pleaded by the 1st Respondent, and not assert any legal title to a land in dispute, is admissible in evidence for that purpose or which it was pleaded and tendered in evidence. Thus, the Court below was right when it held that Exhibit D15, being evidence of payment for land transaction coupled with undisputed possession and exercise of acts of ownership for a long period of 13 years by the 1st Respondent conferred on the 1st Respondent equitable title to the land in dispute. This finding by the Court below is both unimpeachable and impeccable and must be allowed to stand. See Section 15 of the Land Registration Act, Cap 515 of the Laws of the Federal Capital Territory. See also Okoye V. Dumez Nigeria Limited (1985) 6 SC 3.

In Adesanya V. Otuewu (1993) LPELR – 146 (SC), the Supreme Court had stated inter alia thus:

“It is well settled law that the payment of purchase price coupled with being put in possession confers an-equitable title enabling a purchaser in possession to call for a document of title. The title so acquired is capable of defeating subsequent purchasers”

See also Akinlolu V. Akaya (2007) LPELR – 344 (SC), where the Supreme Court had stated inter alia thus:

“A document inadmissible for a purpose may be admissible for another purpose. In the instant case, Exhibit 1 which is inadmissible in proof of title would have been admissible in proof of an appropriate equitable relief claimed.”

See further Nsiegbe V. Mgbemena (2007) LPELR – 2065 (SC), where the Supreme Court had reiterated inter alia thus: “A purchaser of land who has paid and taken possession of the land by virtue of a registrable instrument which has not been registered, has thereby acquired an equitable interest which is as good as a legal estate.”