By Donald Ibebuike
Scene of the explosion
An explosion occurred on Wednesday, February 2, 2022 at an offshore platform, FPSO “TRINITY SPIRIT” managed by Shebah Exploration & Production Company Limited (SEPCOL) (in Receivership), located at Ukpokiti Terminal, off Warri Coast, in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. It was reported that 10 crew members were on board the facility at the time of the explosion and at least three were reported to have died as a result of the incident, while four were alleged to be missing.
The explosion and the fire outbreak that ensued reportedly led to the spillage of about 50,000 barrels of crude oil. The FPSO “TRINITY SPIRIT” was reportedly built 46 years ago and served as the production facility for OML 108 and also as a government licensed terminal for lifting crude produced from OML 108.
The management of the platform, SEPCOL called for calm, while stating that investigation into the cause of the explosion and fire has commenced. It is necessary to point out that the explosion, the fire outbreak, the oil spill, the response and emergency management system, if any, activated to contain and curtail the impact of the incident have serious implications on health, safety & environment (HSE) upstream that would require a thorough investigation. The investigation muted by SEPCOL in their press briefing will not therefore be enough and sufficient for an upstream incident of that magnitude and will at best be for the internal use of the Company.
It is regrettable to observe that the relevant government agencies are not reacting the proper way by calling for empanelling of an Independent Body to conduct a Public Inquiry into the circumstances leading to the explosion and the eventual fire outbreak that ensued in line with international best practices. The Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), the body responsible for regulating health, safety and environmental standards and measures upstream, has issued a publication confirming that it is investigating the incident. It is the view that any investigation championed by the Company and/or the relevant Regulator/s may not serve the purpose, especially if HSE standards had not been observed on the Platform.
The need for an independent body to conduct a public inquiry into the incident becomes even compelling in view of the allegation that the Trinity Spirit was in a dilapidated state with rusted and worn out bolts, panels and leaking cargo pump and also that the regulatory authorities ignored several complaints and warnings on the state of the FPSO as back as 2017. Given the allegation of failure to act leveled against NUPRC, it would be inappropriate for it to champion any investigation into the incident as doing so would amount to one being a judge in its own cause.
In the given circumstances, it would be necessary and expedient for the President to empanel an Independent Public Inquiry pursuant to Section 1 of the Tribunals of Inquiry Act LFN, 2004 to examine the remote and immediate cause of the incident, the response system upon the occurrence of the incident and issue report that would be made public so that lessons learnt therefrom could be used in advancing HSE knowledge, research, rules, procedures, guidelines, standards and regulations.
The envisaged Independent Public Inquiry would be empowered to invite and summon witnesses and take evidence on issues such as the integrity of the asset, the maintenance culture on the asset, compliance with HSE standards, the monitoring and reporting system on the facility and whether compliance or non compliance with HSE standards and regulations could have averted or at best reduce the impact of the explosion and the fire. The panel would also investigate whether the explosion was as a result of sabotage or other causes. Issues such as the readiness of government agencies to respond to emergency situation upstream should also be investigated as well as assessing the adequacy of Nigerian health, safety and environmental laws, monitoring and reporting system with a view to coming up with a robust HSE regulatory system. The Public Inquiry should also consider the manpower strength, expertise and equipment of the NUPRC to monitor and enforce HSE standards and regulations and to swiftly respond to any upstream emergency.
It is important to point out that Section 7 (c) of the Petroleum Industry Act, 2021 empowers the NUPRC to perform health, safety and environmental functions on upstream petroleum operations as part of its technical regulatory functions, while Section 8 gives it commercial regulatory functions. The effect of this is that NUPRC will be responsible for both commercial as well as health and safety functions. This fusion of technical and commercial regulatory functions in one body may lead to regulatory dilemma in that HSE may be compromised to ensure more crude output. There may thus be the need to review whether the fusion of the regulatory functions will affect the effectiveness of NUPRC and whether an independent body would be set up to specifically handle HSE functions upstream.
By way of conclusion, there is the need to take issues relating to HSE seriously and pass the necessary message to operators in the petroleum industry by always setting up an independent investigative inquiry into any HSE incident and making any report arising from such incident public so that lessons learnt from such incident could assist in advancing HSE in the country.
It is observed that the HSE regulatory approach in Nigeria appears to be uncertain but tends more towards hybrid or admixture of prescriptive and self- regulatory approaches to regulation. In view of the fact that most International Oil Companies (IOCs) are divesting their assets to new entrants, mostly indigenous and independent companies, there is the need to have a firm and a robust HSE regulatory system to avert major HSE issues upstream. It is a known fact that IOCs, due to their long experience in the industry have adopted HSE standards into their operations and have sizeable balance sheet to face any HSE requirements or incidents as was the case in the North Sea when the Piper Alpha incident happened and the Macondo blowout in the Gulf of Mexico.
This may not be so with some of the new entrants and independent producers who may not have acquired high technical skill and huge balance sheet to face claims that may arise from any major incident and who may be tempted to cut corners to save cost by compromising on HSE standards. This makes a robust HSE regulatory system imperative at this stage of our national development and the explosion of the Trinity Spirit should serve as a springboard to change the narrative.
Ibebuike, an oil, gas & energy law expert writes from Lagos