By A.A Taofeek

For donkey years, it has been practically observed and agreed that crimes, sometimes, may be committed by an individual or by a group of people. Where a crime is singularly perpetrated by an individual, he shall solely face the penal consequences of his act. Conversely, where a crime is jointly committed by two or more persons, the question arises as to the liability of each person involved in the commission of the crime. Thus, the doctrine of common intention to prosecute unlawful purpose comes to play a role.

Statutorily, the doctrine of common intention has been captured by the Codes ( i.e both Criminal Code and Penal Code) regulating crimes in Nigeria. For the sake of conveniences the provisions of the Codes shall be reproduced herein; Section 79 of the Penal Code provides “When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of those persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone”.

Similarly, Section 8 of the Criminal Code provides “When two or more persons form a common intention to prosecute an unlawful purpose in conjunction with one another, and in the prosecution of such purpose an offence is committed of such a nature that its commission was a probable consequence of the prosecution of such purpose, each of them is deemed to have committed the offence”.

The community reading of the above sections disposes that common intention to prosecute unlawful purpose places liability on each person who participated in the commission of a crime provided that the nature of the act was a probable consequence of their unlawful purpose.

Illustratively, if A, B and C jointly agreed to rob a bank, during the course of the said robbery, B shot and killed D, the doctrine of common intention averred that A, B and C will all be charged for offence of the murder.

ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENCE OF COMMON INTENTION

Juristically, the law is settled that when two or more persons formed a common intention to commit a criminal act in conjunction with one another and in the prosecution of such purpose, an offence is committed of such a nature that its commission was a probable consequences of such purpose, each of them is deemed to have committed the offence. In other words a common intention need not to be based on direct evidence or on express agreement between the perpetrators of an offence charged. It can also be inferred from the circumstances of the case.

However, where there is a common intention to commit an unlawful act, there must be evidence of the three elements that constitute the offence namely;

(a) There must be evidence showing that the accused persons had formed a common intention to prosecute an unlawful purpose together

(b) That in furtherance of the execution of the unlawful purpose a person was robbed and or killed; and

(c) That the death of that person was a probable consequence of prosecution of the unlawful purpose. See IBRAHIM DAN AUTA v. THE STATE (2014) AELR 4383 (CA).

Furthermore, in ALARAPE & ORS V. THE STATE (2001) 2 SC 114, the Apex Court of the land held that a close analysis of Section 8 of the Criminal Code discloses the following requirements or preconditions that must be established before a conviction based thereunder may be sustained. These requirements are as follows:

1) There must be two or more persons

2) They must form a common intention

3) The common intention must be towards prosecuting an unlawful purpose in conjunction with one another

4) An offence must be committed in the process

5) The offence must be of such a nature that its commission was a probable consequence of the prosecution of such purpose.

By and large, the liability for acting in further of common intention to commit unlawful purpose rests largely on all the involved persons. The settled position of the law is that once attack on a victim is made by two or more persons acting in concert and in furtherance of their common intention each and every one of them is liable for consequences of the act. In such a case, it is immaterial which of the accused did what. See Ekpulor v. The State (1990) 12 SCNJ 71, 76.

In the same vein, the Supreme court, Per RHODES-VIVOUR, J.S.C (as he then was) in EMMANUEL EGWUMI v. THE STATE (2013) AELR 1264 held that “where two or more persons form a common intention to kill another person and in furtherance of that intention one or more of them struck the victim with a matchet from which death results, each one of them is guilty of murder punishable with death and it does not matter who actually struck the deadly blow”.

From the foregoing, it is safe to conclude that if several persons pursue a common unlawful object, and one of them does a criminal act within the scope of the common purpose, all are responsible for that act whether it was originally contemplated or not as decided in Mohan v. R (1967) as well as R. V. White Field (1983). Where, however, one of them does an act which was not contemplated by the others and which is outside the common purpose, the others are not criminally liable in respect of that act as it was held in R. v. Peterson (1970).

*A.A Taofeek is a student of Law at the prestigious Usman Dan Fodio University Sokoto. He can always be reached via; olamideajibade02@gmail.com || +2348085374513.